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1. Abstract 
The marginal involvement of the EU in redistributive policies 
and its limited fiscal resources have led to a lack of attention 
to the EU budget and its determinants. In this paper I analyse 
an original dataset containing yearly data on the main macro-
categories of expenditure and how they have changed over 
the last three decades (1984-2013). Using time series 
analysis, I find that the ability to form winning coalitions in 
the Council, the ideological position of the co-legislators, and 
some ‘structuring events’ - like the adoption of the 
Multiannual Financial Framework and the accession of the 
cohesion countries - have a significant role in driving the 
process of budgetary reform.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Introduction 
The European Union general budget establishes on a yearly basis how the fiscal 
resources controlled by the EU are allocated to a range of policies and programmes that 
are directly financed and generally managed by the European Commission. To date, the 
EU budget has not attracted much scholarly attention, perhaps because the fiscal 
resources administered by the EU represent only a fraction of the resources controlled 
by the member states. The vast majority of studies in this field have thus focused on 
national budgets: on their changing composition, on the factors explaining budget 
deficits and on the process of reform. Much more limited research exists on the EU 
budget and this has mainly focused on distributional issues and conflicts: how the EU 
funds are distributed across member states (Aksoy, 2010), the formation of interest 
coalitions in the adoption of multiannual financial frameworks (Blavoukos and 
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Pagoulatos, 2011), and the general pattern of stability and change in budget reform 
(Citi, 2013). Much less is known about the determinants of budgetary reform, i.e. the 
factors driving stability and change in the structure of the EU budget.  
This paper addresses this question and contributes to the existing literature in 
three ways. First, it analyses how the reconfiguration of EU-level collective veto-
players determined by successive rounds of treaty reforms, and how the enlarging 
membership of the EU, have made budget reforms less viable. Second, it estimates the 
impact of the changing ideological composition of the EU legislative bodies and of a 
number of other theoretically relevant variables on the stability and change of the EU 
budget. Third, by contrasting and comparing the findings with an earlier empirical 
analysis on the determinants of policy reform in EU regulatory policies, this paper 
argues that the variables at play in budgetary and regulatory reform are only partially 
overlapping, and that partisan/ideological variables play a much more prominent role in 
budget reforms than in regulatory reform.  
This paper relies on an original dataset tracking the evolution of macro areas of 
expenditure in the EU budget from 1984 to 2013. The reason for developing an original 
dataset is that the budgetary figure published in the Official Journal of the EU are 
affected to a considerable degree by the problem of ‘repackaging’, i.e. shifting specific 
sources of expenditure under new or different headings, a phenomenon that can make 
data collection and analysis unreliable. In order to tackle this problem, this dataset was 
developed by applying a specifically devised codebook, which keeps constant codes 
across the whole timeframe. This ensured data consistency and reliability. 
The paper develops as follows: in the next section, I discuss some key theoretical 
and empirical contributions that have dealt with the problem of explaining budget 
reform and, more generally, policy stability and change. I will focus in particular on 
those perspectives that study budgetary dynamics as a way to study policy dynamics, 
and on those theoretical perspectives that hinge on veto-player theory to explain policy 
stability and change. In the third section I flesh out a set of independent variables that 
according to the literature have a role in the process of policy change, and specify the 
hypotheses that I will test within the empirical section. In the fourth section I dwell on 
the issue of measuring budget reform, and more precisely on how we can capture the 
magnitude of change in budget appropriations. Here I discuss different types of 
measures existing in the literature and justify the use of ‘budget distance’ as an 
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appropriate measurement, illustrating how it is calculated and briefly explaining the 
codebook upon which it is based. Next, in the section on estimation, I test the 
hypothesised relationships between the mentioned variables and discuss the extent to 
which the theoretical expectations developed in the theoretical part of the paper were 
met. In the conclusion I elaborate on the significance of findings and point out the 
implications for the existing literature.  
 
2.1 Theoretical and empirical perspectives 
Most of the literature on public budgets has focused on two different but deeply 
interconnected themes: assessing how budgets evolve both in the short and long term, 
and finding the determinants of stability and change in the composition of public 
budgets.  
The first theme was initially explored by the early incrementalists, who theorised 
that budgets, and public policies in general, are reformed in small and incremental steps 
and through a process of ‘muddling through’. This happens – they argued – because 
policy makers operate under extensive time and information constraints, which severely 
limit opportunities to design large-scale policy reforms (Davis et al., 1966; Lindblom, 
1959; Wildavsky, 1964). Several years later, another group of scholars used the same 
set of assumptions to develop a new model of budget and policy reform that is 
nowadays widely known as the punctuated-equilibrium (P-E) model (Baumgartner and 
Jones, 1993, 2002; Jones and Baumgartner, 2005). The central claim of this model is 
that public policies generally evolve following an incremental pattern of change. 
However, the same factors that produce incremental policy outcomes (bounded 
rationality, time constraints and information constraints), are responsible for the 
‘neglect and overreact’ behaviour of policy makers. According to this perspective, 
policy makers tend to neglect policy issues for long periods of time until these issues 
reach a threshold of severity that ‘force’ policy makers to give them attention and space 
in the policy agenda. When this happens the general pattern of incremental adjustment 
is likely to be interrupted - or ‘punctuated’ - by a discontinuous policy change.  This 
model has been successfully tested on a massive dataset tracking the evolution of the 
US federal legislation and budget over a long period of time (Jones and Baumgartner, 
2005), and on other large-n cross-national datasets (Baumgartner et al., 2009; Jones et 
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al., 2009). As such, the P-E model is nowadays widely accepted as the state of the art in 
the analysis of budget stability and change.  
The second theme is about the determinants of budget reform. Different 
contributors have highlighted different factors at play in the process of budget reform 
but we can broadly identify two main theoretical approaches: on the one hand, the 
agenda-setting approach, on the other hand, approaches based on veto-players variables 
and partisan/ideological variables. The agenda-setting approach, which is a key 
component of the punctuated-equilibrium model explained above, is a behavioural 
model of policy choice that is based on the concept of disproportionate information 
processing (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005: 115–136). Essentially, its main point is that 
the expansion and contraction of policy issues on the agenda are non-incremental 
dynamics, which predict (or anticipate) policy change. The partisan and veto-players 
approaches in contrast predict policy stability and change based on the political 
positioning of legislative bodies and on the configuration of formal and de facto veto-
players participating in the legislative process. For scholars belonging to the second 
approach, agenda setting is not a fundamental factor in explaining policy change unless 
agenda dynamics are able to reshape the policy preferences of veto-players.  
In the EU context, predicting budget reform through the lens of agenda-setting is 
quite problematic for a number of reasons. One of these is that the ‘EU agenda’ cannot 
be tracked easily: the Parliament and the Council as the two legislative branches have 
their own agendas, but neither of them can initiate legislation. The legislative initiative 
is left to the Commission, which controls its own agenda and, in part, the global EU 
agenda. The European Council provides an additional layer of complexity: it has no 
legislative power at all but defines the general political priorities of the EU, and as such 
it contributes substantially to shaping the EU agenda, although in a very indirect way. 
Moreover, the current scarcity of data on EU agenda dynamics does not allow a full-
blown investigation of its impact on policy (and budgetary) change.1 In this paper I will 
therefore take the second perspective by analysing the impact of institutional and 
partisan veto-players in the process of budget reform.  
Several contributions have relied on veto-player theory to analyse the reform of 
national budgets. Most of them have examined the impact of partisan veto-players on 
																																																								
1	The	only	available	dataset	at	the	time	of	writing	is	the	European	branch	of	the	policy	agendas	
project,	available	at:	http://www.policyagendas.eu/	
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the budget of specific states: Germany (Bawn, 1999; König and Troeger, 2005), 
Denmark, Germany, United Kingdom and United States (Breunig, 2006) and on a larger 
panel of 19 OECD countries (Bräuninger, 2005). In all these cases, the key dimension 
being investigated was the distance in policy preferences between the parties of the 
government coalition, or the distance in policy preferences between two successive 
governments. This distance (which is generally estimated on the basis of party 
manifesto data or expert survey data) was found to have a significant impact on the 
stability and change of national budgets in all cases. Nevertheless, we know from veto-
player theory that partisan veto-players are not the only type of veto actors participating 
in the policy process. Institutional veto-players, defined as the constitutional 
configuration of individual or collective actors whose consent is necessary to change the 
status quo, are at least as important as partisan veto-players (Tsebelis, 2002: 19). Thus, 
in a larger comparative study Tsebelis and Chang (2004) estimated the impact of 
institutional and partisan veto-players on the national budgets of 19 OECD countries, 
finding that both of them have a significant impact in determining budget stability and 
change. In this paper I follow this line of investigation, studying how these two types of 
veto-player variables drive stability and change in the composition of the EU budget. 
It is worth noting that the vast majority of empirical studies on budget reform are 
focused on the national level. Only a few studies exist on EU-level budget reform, and 
these are mainly concerned with distributional conflicts between member states, 
emphasising either the bargaining behaviour of member states during the budgetary 
negotiations (Aksoy, 2010; Schneider, 2013), or the patterns of coalition building in the 
negotiations for the multiannual financial framework (Blavoukos and Pagoulatos, 
2011). Taking a different perspective, Citi (2013) has shown that the EU budget is 
reformed following a pattern that closely approximates the punctuated-equilibrium 
dynamic (Citi, 2013). However, none of these EU-level studies has identified the factors 
that explain policy reform and inertia in the EU budget. Not much is known about the 
extent to which different configurations of institutional veto-players - created or 
reshaped by successive treaty reforms - have determined more or less stability in the EU 
budget. In the same vein, it is not entirely clear whether the changing ideological 
composition of the EU legislative branches, and their changing ideological distance, has 
determined larger or smaller budget reforms. These questions are particularly relevant if 
we consider claims in the literature that the EU is a political system whose policies are 
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increasingly driven by partisan control in the Council and the Parliament (Hix, 2008: 
110–136). If this is the case, we should find that the changing ideological composition 
of EU legislative bodies has an impact on the stability and change of the EU budget. My 
specific hypotheses are laid out in the next section.    
 
3. Independent variables and hypotheses 
3.1 Institutional variables  
The EU budget is adopted following a procedure that was laid out in the budgetary 
treaties of 1970 and 1975. This procedure closely resembles the ordinary legislative 
procedure and is composed of several steps, which can be visualized as follows: the 
Commission starts the process by drafting the preliminary budget, and then it forwards 
the proposal to the two legislative branches. At this point the Council and Parliament 
have at their disposal up to two readings each and a final round of conciliation 
committee discussion for agreeing on a single document.2 Before the Lisbon Treaty, the 
legal provisions were such that the Council had the last word on compulsory 
expenditure (essentially the common agricultural policy), whereas Parliament had the 
last word on non-compulsory expenditure (all the other expenditure policies). However, 
considering Parliament’s possibility to reject draft budgets in order to extract more 
concessions (which happened for the 1980 and 1985 budgets), and the practice 
developed since 1988 of agreeing on common and binding multiannual financial 
frameworks, both the branches of the legislature have a de facto veto power on all the 
constituent parts of the budget. 
Nevertheless, from the perspective of veto-player theory both the Council and 
Parliament are not individual veto-players but collective veto-players. This means their 
ability to change the status quo hinges on their capacity to build pro-reform coalitions. 
In Parliament, coalition-building is largely based on loose agreements between the main 
party groups, which tend to align along the classical left-right axis (Hix et al., 2005). 
Thus the changing ideological composition of Parliament may change the weight or 
composition of these coalitions, which in turn may alter the Parliament’s position in 
																																																								
2	The	procedure	is	regulated	by	art.	313‐316	TFEU.	Earlier	versions	of	the	same	provisions	
are:	art.	271‐273	TEC	(post‐Amsterdam),	art.	202‐204	TEC	(post‐Maastricht)	and	art.	11‐
12	of	the	1975	Budgetary	Treaty.	
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regard to the status quo. This variability in the ideological composition of Parliament is 
well captured by the partisan veto-player variables described below.  
Analysing the Council as a collective veto-player is more complex, as coalitions 
that form during the budgetary negotiations tend to be more unstable and volatile. 
According to some recent evidence collected by Blavoukos and Pagoulatos, these 
coalitions are generally ad hoc and based on national interests, ideological proximity, or 
a combination of the two (Blavoukos and Pagoulatos, 2011: 574). Hence, a variable that 
holds a high potential for predicting budget reform is the ability of Council members to 
form ‘winning coalitions’ for changing status quo policies. This variable is determined 
by two parameters: the threshold for qualified majority and the distribution of voting 
weight between member states. Both these parameters have been subject to change in 
the last three decades, mostly due to treaty changes that were adopted to accommodate 
new member states or to reforms that were made to adjust the efficiency of the decision-
making process. These reforms have changed the unanimity core and the status quo 
winset of the Council, making policy reform more (or less viable). For example, the 
triple-qualified majority vote (henceforth: QMV) introduced by the Treaty of Nice 
increased the Council’s unanimity core making policy reform much more difficult 
(Tsebelis, 2002: 270–71). On the contrary, the Lisbon Treaty’s abolition of the triple-
qualified majority made QMV easier to reach, and made pro-reform coalitions easier to 
build (Tsebelis, 2012). 
The literature on power indexes has developed a reliable method for measuring 
the ability to form winning coalitions: a measure that makes use of the threshold (one or 
multiple) for reaching QMV and the voting weight attributed to each member state to 
calculate the percentage of winning coalitions out of the total number of possible 
coalitions. This measure has already been employed in the literature on veto-players’ 
analysis of the Council’s decision-making (Tsebelis, 2006, 2012). Given the 
considerable computational task implied in this calculation, the software Indices of 
Power – IOP 2.0 developed by Thomas Bräuninger - was used to calculate how the 
percentage of winning coalitions in the Council changed as a function of treaty reform 
in the last three decades.3 The resulting score is one of the key independent variables of 
the empirical analysis. Essentially, a higher score signifies a greater chance of forming 
																																																								
3	Available	on	http://www.tbraeuninger.de/download/	
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pro-reform coalitions, making policy change more likely. The first hypothesis to be 
tested is therefore:  
 
Hypothesis H1: The higher the percentage of winning coalitions in the 
Council, the higher the budget deviation from the status quo. 
 
A second and related hypothesis is that the process of enlargement has had a 
constraining effect on the ability to reform the budget. This hypothesis, which has 
surfaced several times in the literature (Hosli, 1999; Konig and Bräuninger, 2004; 
Zimmer et al., 2005), assumes that the process of enlargement determines the need to 
accommodate an increasing variety of demands and sometimes opposing policy 
preferences. Hence, the process of enlargement tends to produce policy inertia, which is 
only partially mitigated by the use of QMV. The hypothesis I will test is therefore: 
 
Hypothesis H2: The higher the number of member states, the smaller budget 
deviation from the status quo. 
 
3.2 Partisan variables 
Political parties have traditionally been characterised by different preferences with 
regard to fiscal policy and spending priorities. For instance, several papers have 
established a clear link between the ideological attributes of parties in government and 
budget deficits (Blais et al., 1993; Roubini and Sachs, 1989). Other contributions have 
found that the sway of the political pendulum from the left to the right and vice versa 
has an impact on the spending priorities of the government (Bawn, 1999; Bräuninger, 
2005; Tsebelis and Chang, 2004). In all these cases, partisan politics has been proven to 
matter in budgetary reform. However, all the studies mentioned above are focused on 
the national level. No study, to the best of my knowledge, has yet investigated the 
impact of changing ideological composition of the two legislative bodies of the EU on 
annual spending priorities. For this reason, two of the key hypotheses being tested in the 
empirical analysis are: 
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Hypothesis H3: The changing ideological composition of the European 
Parliament determines a reallocation of resources across budgetary 
functions.  
 
Hypothesis H4: The changing ideological composition of the Council 
determines reallocation of resources across budgetary functions. 
 
In order to test these hypotheses I rely on a dataset tracking the changing ideological 
composition of the EU legislative bodies during the years 1980-2010 (Klüver and 
Sagarzazu, 2013). The Klüver and Sagarzazu dataset estimates the positioning of the EU 
legislative branches by means of a multiple-stage procedure: in the first stage all the 
parties represented in Parliament and in the Council are located on a left-right scale on 
the basis of a textual analysis of party manifestos. In the second stage the ideological 
position of the two legislative branches is estimated by computing the weighted average 
position of all the parties represented in Parliament and the Council. In this dataset a 
negative score signifies a left-leaning position, whereas a positive score signifies a right-
leaning position. Considering that Parliament’s composition changes every five years, 
and that the Council’s composition changes every time a member state elects a new 
government, the Parliament’s ideological position is re-calculated every five years, 
whereas the Council’s position is re-calculated every time there is a change in 
government in one of the member states. This data is then transformed into yearly a time 
series. The measure of ideological positioning of the Commission, which is part of the 
original Klüver and Sagarzazu dataset, was not retained in this analysis as the role of the 
Commission in budgeting is limited to drafting the preliminary budget. 
 
3.4 Control variables  
Existing analyses on the determinants of budget reforms usually contain some 
additional variables to control for a number of ‘non-deliberate’ changes, i.e. budgetary 
mechanisms that are in place to respond either automatically or quasi-automatically to 
changing conditions in the policy environment. For instance, a sharp decline in the 
growth rate of a country, or a rise in unemployment, or the changing costs of servicing 
the public debt will normally trigger some budgetary responses that are not necessarily 
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determined by partisan or veto-players variables, and as such need to be controlled for 
(Bawn, 1999; Bräuninger, 2005; Tsebelis and Chang, 2004).  
However, the EU does not pay unemployment benefits, it does not have specific 
sources of expenditure for countercyclical measures, nor does it have interest to pay for 
servicing a debt. In this sense, practically all EU budget changes can be considered as 
deliberate. Notwithstanding this there exists one type of exogenous event that can 
determine a significant change in budgetary appropriations: the enlargement of the EU 
to include countries that are defined as ‘cohesion countries’, characterised by an income 
that is substantially lower than the EU average and is in need of substantial investment 
in structural and cohesion funds. Thus, another hypothesis I will investigate is the 
following: 
 
Hypothesis H5: The accession of a new cohesion country to the EU will 
determine a reallocation of resources across budgetary functions.  
 
In order to test this hypothesis a dummy variable was included in the dataset. The 
variable takes the value of 1 in the years when one (or more) of the cohesion 
countries entered the EU and zero in all others.4 Another hypothesis I test is that 
the EU is affected by a political budgetary cycle. The literature on public budgets 
has shown that increasing public spending (especially pork barrel) during electoral 
or pre-electoral years is quite common in a number democracies (Drazen, 2000; 
Franzese, 2002; Rogoff, 1990). This is a dynamic that could, at least theoretically, 
affect the EU as well. Hence the sixth hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis H6: There is a reallocation of expenditure in 
correspondence with the EU elections. 
 
This hypothesis is tested with the help of a dummy variable that takes the value of 
1 during all the electoral years and the value of zero in all other years. 
The final hypothesis is that budget reforms are strongly influenced by the 
political negotiations leading to the adoption of the Multiannual Financial 
																																																								
4	The	dummy	variable	takes	the	value	of	1	during	the	following	years:	1986,	2004,	2007,	
i.e.	for	the	accession	of	Spain,	Portugal,	the	EU	enlargement	of	2004	to	include	eastern	
Europe	and	the	enlargement	of	2007	to	include	Romania	and	Bulgaria.	
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Framework (MFF). The MFF is an inter-institutional agreement between the 
Council and Parliament that sets the ceiling for expenditure for the next seven 
years and establishes some very general priorities for expenditure. The MFF was 
created in 1988 on the impulse of Parliament, which wanted to have more power 
over EU expenditure. This development gave Parliament a de facto veto power in 
all the main categories of expenditure in the budget, and the power to influence the 
general fiscal priorities of the EU. Moreover, considering that the Council adopts 
the MFF by unanimity and that each member state pushes for its priorities, the 
process leading to the adoption of the MFF tends to be characterised by hard 
bargaining between member states. The specific hypothesis being investigated is 
that a number of intra-EU cleavages and coalitions tend to come into play during 
the process of adoption of the MFF (Blavoukos and Pagoulatos, 2011), leading to 
‘grand bargains’ (Laffan, 2000) that have a structuring effect on the budgets 
adopted in the next seven years. I test this hypothesis with different dummy 
variables for each MFF. 
 
3.5 The dependent variable: budget distance 
Following an approach developed by Tsebelis and Chang for measuring budget reform 
in 19 OECD countries (Tsebelis and Chang, 2004), I conceptualise the EU budget as a  
vector in an n-dimensional policy space, each dimension representing the allocation of 
budget to a specific jurisdiction. Considering that each jurisdiction is allocated a 
percentage of the general budget, the annual budget can then be represented as a 
sequence of percentages (a1, a2… an). Under these assumptions, it is possible to 
calculate the ‘extensiveness’ of budget reform by summing the squared deviations from 
the previous year’s allocations to the same jurisdictions, and then taking the square root 
of the resulting number. The output variable, called budget distance (BD), can be 
formalised as follows: 
 
          BD = ඥሺܽଵ,௧ െ	ܽଵ,௧ିଵሻଶ ൅	ሺܽଶ,௧ െ	ܽଶ,௧ିଵሻଶ ൅ ⋯ሺܽ௡,௧ െ	ܽ௡,௧ିଵሻଶ                    (1) 
                             
where a1,t  is the percentage of budget allocated to jurisdiction a1 at time t, a1,t-1 is the 
percentage of the budget allocated to the same jurisdiction the year before, and an,t – an,t-
1 is the difference between the budget allocated to the nth jurisdiction at time t and at 
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time t-1. In a nutshell, this measure synthetises in one single variable the total amount of 
yearly changes made to all the jurisdictions of the EU budget. Its general dynamic is 
represented in Figure 1. The use of percentages instead of real budgetary figures allows 
to control for three confounding factors that would artificially inflate the budgetary 
figures: the changeover from ECU to Euro as the official unit of account, the general 
increase in the extent of budgetary resources determined by the higher number of states 
that have joined the EU, and the effect of inflation.  
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
In order to make the process of data collection and analysis more manageable, I 
employed a codebook that classifies the entire set of sources of expenditure into a few 
jurisdictions, or macro-categories, of expenditure. This is justified by the fact that, 
despite the wide variety of programmes financed by the budget, the EU has only a 
limited number of expenditure policies: agriculture and fisheries, regional cohesion, 
research and technology, social policy, external action and expenditure for 
administration. Moreover, if we want to consistently track the changing budgetary 
structure of a political entity that over the last thirty years has evolved considerably, 
acquiring more and more competences and developing new programmes almost every 
year, we need to use a codebook that remains consistent across the years, and rely on 
some broad categories of expenditure that were already extant in the base year. Finally, 
the use of macro-categories allows focusing on the general trends of stability and 
change in expenditure policies, disregarding the ‘noise’ generated by a number of 
idiosyncratic smaller-scale programmes that the EU created over the years. The 
codebook is represented in its essential form in Table 1. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
3.6 Estimation and results 
Before testing the models through OLS regressions, the time series properties of the 
data were carefully checked. A first visual inspection of Figure 1 (which represents the 
evolution of the dependent variable in the relevant timeframe) shows no evident trend in 
the data. This suggests the series might be stationary and suitable for OLS regression. 
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However, in order to formally test the hypothesis that there is no trend in the series, I 
ran the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test for a unit root in the variable budget 
distance. The test rejected, by an ample margin, the null hypothesis on the presence of a 
unit root in the series. Moreover, all the time series’ included in the models were 
checked for serial correlation by running the Portmanteau (Q) statistic on the residuals 
of all the regressions. In all cases, the test failed to reject the null hypothesis of no serial 
correlation. 
Table 2 shows the results of the OLS regressions for the five tested models.  The 
first model is the simplest one, taking into account the institutional determinants only: 
the winning coalitions variable and the expanding EU membership variable. As the 
regression table shows, an enlarged membership of the EU produces a significant 
negative effect on budget distance. This means that at constant voting rules in the 
Council, an enlarged EU has a lower ability to reform the budget. As to the winning 
coalitions in the Council, the relevant coefficient in model 1 shows that an increase in 
the percentage of winning coalitions (and thus a greater ability to form coalitions in the 
Council) produces a negative effect on the extensiveness of budget reform. This 
requires some interpretation: while the negative relationship between the size of the EU 
membership and the extent of budget reform is in line with what was hypothesised in 
the theoretical section, the relationship between winning coalitions in the Council and 
budget reform goes in the opposite direction to what was expected following hypothesis 
H1:  the evidence shows that greater ability to form coalitions in the Council results in 
smaller budgetary change. Admittedly this is a somewhat surprising finding, which we 
can interpret with the presence in the Council of a wide coalition in favour of a 
budgetary status quo. In this case a lower threshold for forming winning coalitions will 
imply an easier way for the dominant coalition to maintain the status quo. In other 
words, the coalition in favour of the status quo will still be able to dominate the game 
even in the case of defection of some of its members. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
Model 2 adds the partisan variables to the institutional variables, and more 
specifically the ideological position of Parliament and the Council. Following the 
Klüver and Sagarzazu dataset (2013), the ideological position is measured with a 
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continuous variable ranging from highly negative scores, representing extreme left 
positions, to highly positive scores, representing extreme right positions. A score of zero 
or close to zero represents a centrist position. The scores of Parliament and the Council 
are weighted averages, where the weights are constituted by the size of parliamentary 
groups in the case of Parliament, and the number of votes available to a country in the 
case of the Council. As the regression table shows, if we control for the effect of the 
institutional variables examined above, a one-point increase in the left-right scale (that 
is to say a one-point movement toward the right) produces a highly significant negative 
score on the output variable. This means a shift to the right in the ideological 
composition of the two legislative bodies determines budgetary choices that are more 
status-quo oriented. This finding is particularly interesting in light of some earlier 
research on regulatory dynamics in the EU, which found that the same partisan variables 
had no significant impact on regulatory expansion and dismantling (Citi and Justesen, 
2013), and implies that the variables at play in budgetary and regulatory reform only 
partially overlap, and that partisan variables play a more important role in budgetary 
reforms than in regulatory reform. 
Model 3 adds the first control variable: the accession to the EU of new ‘cohesion 
countries’, characterised either by a per capita GDP that is significantly lower than the 
EU average, or by a very low level of internal economic cohesion. The literature has 
presented considerable qualitative evidence showing that the accession of these 
countries has historically sparked extensive budgetary bargains, which in turn have 
resulted in re-balancing expenditure priorities (see for instance: Blavoukos and 
Pagoulatos 2011). However, model 3 tests on a larger-n dataset whether there is a 
systematic relationship between the two variables, while controlling for the institutional 
and partisan variables. The coefficient of model 3 in Table 2 shows that indeed this is 
the case: the accession of these countries has led to a statistically significant change in 
the allocations of expenditure across the main areas of expenditure. Looking more 
closely at the raw data, one can observe a substantial movement of resources from areas 
like common agricultural policy to regional policy and the European social fund in 
correspondence with these enlargement rounds. 
Model 4 checks for the impact of another potentially important independent 
variable: political budget cycles. There is no specific theoretical and empirical literature 
on political budget cycles at the EU level.  However, there is extensive comparative 
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literature on this phenomenon whereby government spending tends to be skewed toward 
higher visibility programmes during election years. In this model I tested the hypothesis 
that there is a reallocation of expenditure in correspondence with EU election years. The 
regression output reports a non-significant coefficient for this model, implying that 
there is no clear evidence of such a cycle at the EU level. 
Finally, model 5 tests a more complex hypothesis: that the long negotiation 
rounds leading to the adoption of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) are 
‘structuring events’, i.e. moments when the real political cleavages of the EU in fact 
come into play, structuring the budgetary choices of the following years. The hypothesis 
is tested by entering the partisan variables and the MFF variables into the same 
regression. The coefficients of model 5 show that MFFs indeed have a significant 
impact on yearly budgets (with the exception of the first MFF), and that the latest MFFs 
with their increasingly negative scores have become much more status-quo oriented 
than earlier MFFs. Interestingly, the variable representing the Council’s ideological 
composition remains significant in this model, while the corresponding Parliament’s 
variable becomes insignificant, as a substantial part of the variability is now captured by 
the MFF variables. Theoretically, this can be interpreted by taking into account that it is 
exactly during the MFF negotiations that Parliament tends to act as a non-partisan and 
unitary veto-player, typically deploying its full bargaining power in order to get greater 
expenditure in all areas of the budget. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
This article has analysed the role of some EU-level institutional and political 
determinants in the reform of the EU budget. The analysis, based on a new dataset on 
the evolution of all the macro areas of expenditure in the long run, found evidence that 
different types of variables drive stability and change in the EU budget. Among the 
institutional variables, the growing membership of the EU was found to have a 
constraining effect on budget reform, while the higher percentage of winning coalitions 
(a measure of member states’ ability to form coalitions in the Council) was not found to 
make budget reform any easier. This finding, which runs counter to what was 
hypothesized in the theoretical section, can be interpreted with the existence of a wide 
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coalition of member states in favour of a budgetary status quo which is made even 
stronger by a more reachable qualified majority.  
Among the partisan variables, both Parliament and the Council’s ideological 
composition were found to have an influence on the extensiveness of budget reform 
when the institutional variables were controlled. More specifically, a positive one-point 
movement on the left-right axis (that is a movement to the right of the two co-
legislators) produced a significantly smaller budget reform, whereas a one-point 
movement to the left determined a significantly wider budget reform. This finding is 
particularly interesting if we consider that an earlier large-n analysis of regulatory 
reform in the EU found no evidence that the same partisan variables have a significant 
influence on the dynamics of regulatory expansion/dismantling. Hence, we can 
conclude that the variables at play in budgetary and regulatory reform in the EU only 
partially overlap, and that partisan variables play a much more significant role in budget 
reforms than in regulatory reform.  
As for the additional variables studied in the five models, the analysis did not find 
any evidence of the existence of a political budget cycle at the EU level. This finding is 
relevant both for the literature on EU policy-making and for the broader literature on 
public budgeting, since there are many instances of comparative analyses on this 
phenomenon at the level of nation-state, but not at the EU level. Finally, the data 
showed significant evidence of the role of some ‘structuring events’ in the reform of the 
budget. Among these, the accession of cohesion countries to the EU was found to be 
responsible of some of the most extensive budgetary reallocations. In a similar fashion, 
the big negotiation rounds leading to the adoption of multiannual financial perspectives 
(MFF) were found to have an equally strong influence on the rate of reform of annual 
budgets. On a more general level, the implications of this paper are that the interplay 
between institutional variables, political variables and highly salient structuring events 
is something that deserves more attention in further research 
Figure 1. The time series of budget distance, by year (1985-2013) 
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Table 1. Codes used for coding the EU’s macro areas of expenditure 
1. Common agriculture and 
fisheries policy 
1.1 European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Funds 
1.2 Rural development programmes  
1.3 Common Fisheries Policy  
2. Regional Policy and cohesion 2.1 European regional development funds 
2.2 Cohesion funds 
3. External relations 3.1 External relations 
3.2 Trade 
3.3 Enlargement and neighbourhood policy 
3.4 Humanitarian aid 
 
4. Social policy and social 
affairs 
4.1 European Social Fund 
4.2 Education and youth policy  
4.3 Other social policies 
5. Research and Technology 
development 
5.1 Framework programme   
5.2 Information society and media 
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6. Administration and other 6.1 Administrative expenditure of Parliament, Council, ECJ, 
and all the other administrative bodies (except Commission) 
6.2 All other expenditure 
 
Table 2. Explaining budget reform in the EU (1984-2013) 
VARIABLES Model (1) 
Institutional 
variables 
Model (2) 
Partisan and 
institutional 
variables 
Model (3) 
Partisan and 
institutional 
variables with 
control I 
Model (4) 
Partisan and 
institutional 
variables with 
control II 
Model (5) 
Partisan 
variables and 
financial 
perspectives 
 
      
Institutional variables 
 
     
Council winning coalitions t-1 -0.283** -0.237** -0.169 -0.239*  
 (0.129) (0.112) (0.107) (0.117)  
EU membershipt-1 -0.202*** -0.320*** -0.276*** -0.322***  
 (0.067) (0.083) (0.078) (0.087)  
      
Partisan variables 
 
     
L-R Councilt-1  -0.397*** -0.344** -0.400*** -0.455*** 
  (0.133) (0.124) (0.140) (0.150) 
L-R EPt-1  -0.337*** -0.372*** -0.338*** -0.093 
  (0.110) (0.102) (0.113) (0.163) 
      
Control variables 
 
     
Cohesion country access   2.264**  2.235** 
   (0.974)  (1.006) 
Political budget cycle    0.070  
    (0.856)  
Financial Persp. 1988-92     -1.719 
     (1.172) 
Financial Persp. 1993-99     -2.591** 
     (1.121) 
Financial Persp. 2000-06     -5.793*** 
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     (1.791) 
Financial Persp. 2007-13     -6.100*** 
     (1.657) 
Constant 8.138*** 10.867*** 9.406*** 10.893*** 7.543*** 
 (1.709) (1.906) (1.850) (1.975) (1.282) 
      
Observations 29 27 27 27 27 
R-squared 
 
0.265 0.521 0.619 0.521 0.648 
Notes: The dependent variable is budget distance, a measure of extensiveness of budget reform. 
All models are estimated using OLS in Stata 13. Institutional and partisan variables are lagged 
one year (the budget is adopted the year before its entry into force). Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  
* significant at .1; ** significant at .05; *** significant at .01 
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